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WHO OWNS A CORPORATION AND WHO CARES?
RICHARD A. BOOTH*
INTRODUcTION
Some theories are so widely accepted that we forget they are
theories. One such theory is the theory that a corporation is owned
by its stockholders. This theory has proved useful as a way of
organizing our thoughts about corporation law. It has helped us
define the duty owed by directors and officers to the corporation and
to the stockholders.
Most commentators would likely agree that a corporation is
owned by its stockholders and that management has a duty to
maximize stockholder wealth.' But the courts have generally resisted
the temptation to go quite so far, except in limited circumstances such
as review of takeover defenses or tactics in connection with a change
of control.' The theory of stockholder ownership has also served to
limit the duties owed by management to other constituencies. 3 But
here too the theory has been limited by statute in most states.4 So the
question is, just how good a theory is it?
But first a word on theory generally. It is not entirely clear that a
legal theory is a theory in the same sense that the efficient market
theory or portfolio theory or option pricing theory or the capital asset
pricing model are theories. One key difference is that a legal theory
is usually viewed as normative rather than descriptive. On the other
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. See generally MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 97
(1995); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 248-65 (1999); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy
Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 277-78 (1998). For a notable example of an argument based on the
shareholder wealth maximization norm, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161
(1981).
2. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986).
3. See Comm. on Corp. Laws, Am. Bar Ass'n, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for
Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253 (1990).
4. See id.
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hand there is certainly a school of thought-the contractual theory of
the corporation -that the primary function of corporation law is to
replicate the arrangements that people would make for themselves.5
And in any given case, it may be quite difficult to tell whether the
court is telling us how the law should be or telling us why the parties
did not live up to the law as it is. For example, Smith v. Van Gorkom6
may be seen either as holding that the board of directors failed to do
its existing duty in connection with approving a merger transaction or
as setting a new standard requiring that all boards of directors must
seek to maximize stockholder value, as was made explicit months
later in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.7
To the extent that corporation law is in fact descriptive, it seems
quite clear that theories of organization such as the theory of the firm
are relevant to corporation law. The theory of the firm seeks to tell
us why firms form and thus may tell us why corporation law is how it
is and how it should be different.8 And even if corporation law is
descriptive, there is no reason to think that it should be static. To
borrow a phrase from the Army, corporation law should be all it can
be. Thus, the distinction between the descriptive and the normative
ultimately breaks down. In any case, if nature can have laws, the law
can have theories.
While we are on the subject, why do we need a theory anyway?
As in the sciences, a legal theory should be tested by its predictive
value. A good theory should predict what the law will be in any given
case; that is, a good legal theory predicts how a case will-or should-
turn out. Thus, legal theories help us discover what the law is
(depending, of course, on what "is" means). 9 Moreover, unlike
theories that deal with the laws of nature, with legal theories we can
5. For the best discussion (and criticism) of this view, see Victor Brudney, Contract and
Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REv. 595 (1997). On the one hand, the
contractarian view of the corporation seems trivial. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law
Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542 (1990). What possible
justification could there be for corporation law to do something other than replicate the
arrangements parties would make for themselves? No one today would seriously argue that a
corporation should serve some public or social purpose determined by someone other than its
constituents. On the other hand, the contractarian view makes some sense in the context of the
debate over whether the rules of corporation law should be at all mandatory. For example,
mandatory rules may be necessary where shareholders are numerous and scattered and thus
suffer from collective action problems. For a broad ranging discussion of this issue, see
Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989).
6. 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985).
7. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
8. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 247.
9. Thank you Bill Clinton.
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sometimes reach the conclusion that a particular case turned out
incorrectly, in which case it may be reversed or may just sit there as
bad law. A scientist cannot simply dismiss errant observations (cold
fusion notwithstanding). Newton is lucky he did not see an apple rise
back into the tree.
Theory is not just for academics anymore (if it ever was). Al-
though a lawyer would prefer to find a case that is on "all fours" with
the problem at hand, one is seldom so lucky. (How it is that so many
new legal problems pop up with such regularity-like gophers in an
arcade game-is a question for another day.) And if it were common
to find such easy answers, there would not be much money in doing it.
In short, a lawyer would be lost without a theory, even if it is just a
little one to bridge the gap between that lawyer's own case and a
three-legged stool. Moreover, a lawyer needs to know the difference
between a good theory and a not-so-good theory. Aside from
prevailing in the courtroom when there is "no controlling legal
authority,"'10 a lawyer who does deals will often need to decide how
strong an opinion to give. Is it merely more likely than not that a
court would rule in favor of the client, or can one say that a court
should so rule, or even will so rule?
This also suggests a role for academics. To paraphrase Barry
Manilow, we write the theories." Few lawyers have the time or can
take the risk to develop their own theories. Indeed, when it comes to
legal theories, a newly discovered one tends to be less worthy than a
well-worn one-at least in the courtroom. Other things being equal,
a lawyer would probably rather use an argument that has been used
before and for which there is a citation. Thus, we academics serve as
a source of theories (and sometimes testimony to back them up),
though we may be even fonder of citations and footnotes than our
practicing siblings. What is really peculiar is that the theoreticians are
left in charge of the students, though it may be that only before such
an audience are we willing to try out some of our more radical ideas.
Theories are the scope through which we find facts. That is, they
tell us what facts to look for. The danger is that we may miss facts
that we are not looking for or disregard them as noise. But when the
noise drowns out the music, it may be time for a new theory.
10. Thank you Al Gore.
11. This should not be taken as an admission that I like or ever intentionally listen to Barry
Manilow. Rather, when the bailiff asked, "Do you swear... ?", I would answer, as did Curly of
the Three Stooges, "No. But I know all the words."
2001]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
I. THE STOCKHOLDER OWNERSHIP THEORY
So how good is the stockholder ownership theory as a theory?
Not very. It does not describe the law very well, nor does it do a very
good job as a normative matter. Indeed, it does not even address
many of the most important questions that arise these days.
The stockholder ownership theory has been under attack almost
from its conception. Although the 1919 Michigan Supreme Court
heartily endorsed the theory in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,12 it was
nonetheless controversial when Berle and Means reasserted it in The
Modern Corporation and Private Property.3 Up until the mid-1970s,
the primary challenge came from those who argued for corporate
social responsibility in various forms, and the debate was about for
whom managers should be trustees (though it was never very clear
that trust law bore much relation to corporation law). 14 Since then,
scholars of the law and economics persuasion have argued that
managerialism and empire building (sometimes under the guise of
being a good corporate citizen) is the real danger. 5 In the last few
years, the so-called progressive school has emerged to argue that a
board of directors should consider the interests not just of its
stockholders, but rather of a variety of constituencies. 6 Although the
courts have largely rejected this view,17 the courts have not unequivo-
cally ruled that a board of directors has the obligation to maximize
stockholder wealth either.
It is in this historical context that Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout
have argued in a series of recent articles that the classical view of the
corporation is flawed because it does not adequately explain the
separation of ownership from control and-more important-why
investors would submit to it.18 Their answer is that the board of
directors of a public corporation functions as a "mediating hierarchy"
that allows various actors to entrust inputs to a corporation in
12. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
13. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
14. See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953); see generally A.A.
Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve?: The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty
Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33 (1991). Regarding the limitations of the trustee analogy,
see Smith, supra note 1.
15. See Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 117 (1988).
16. See generally PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
17. See, e.g., Munford, Inc. v. Valuation Research Corp., 98 F.3d 604 (11th Cir. 1996).
18. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 247.
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situations in which the prospect of gain from collective action exceeds
the return that one would expect from retaining control over one's
own inputs. 9 In other words, because all of the contributors distrust
each other to some extent, they all agree to give up control to a
neutral third party. Specifically, the various actors are willing to give
up control over their own inputs because the corporate form serves
(1) to streamline information gathering and decision making, (2) to
control shirking, and (3) to resolve disputes among various con-
stituencies. 0 In this last connection, they suggest that the board of
directors acts more like a judge or referee-sorting out the claims of
various corporate constituencies -than it acts as a principal.21 And
they suggest that the arrangement is worth the cost of lost control
even though reliance on a board of directors leads to the creation of
additional agency costs. 22 From these premises, they argue that the
progressive or communitarian view of the corporation is more
accurate than either the traditional or the contractarian view of the
corporation.23
Although the Blair-Stout Project affords important insights, it is
flawed in at least two key respects. First, their argument is based on
the notion that various actors contribute firm-specific inputs that
cannot be withdrawn. 24  That simply is not true in the case of
stockholders who contribute fungible cash and who can sell without
notice.25 Neither is it clearly true of bondholders or even lower-level
employees. Indeed, it is only clearly true of management. Thus, it
makes much more sense to think of the corporate form as designed to
serve management and to think of stockholders and the market as the
disinterested mediating hierarch. 26 And as it turns out, the evidence
in support of this paradigm is quite substantial.
19. Id. at 265-76.
20. Id. at 276-78.
21. Id. This suggests that one will choose to form a corporation only if there is the prospect
of economic rents (relative to other uses of the inputs, that is, opportunity costs), which may in
turn explain the remarkable survival of the corporate income tax in the face of persistent
academic criticism.
22. Id. at 283-87.
23. Id. at 253.
24. Id. at 265-76. This may also explain why the courts have traditionally been reluctant to
order the involuntary dissolution of corporations even in fairly egregious cases.
25. Of course, a shareholder with a significant stake may find it more difficult to sell out as
a practical matter and perhaps even as a legal matter.
26. I do not mean to suggest that the corporate form was somehow designed in the first
place to perform this function, or even that it had come to do so as long ago as 1980. Rather, I
only mean to suggest that since the mid-1980s the courts, legislators, regulators, commentators,
and the markets have case-by-case and step-by-step intuited that corporations so function.
2001]
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Second, one of the central mysteries that Blair and Stout seek to
explain-the separation of management from control-seems to be
evolving out of existence. Many companies now feature substantial
management and employee ownership as a result of generous grants
of stock options and the use of company stock to fund pension plans.
As of 1999, among the two hundred largest US companies, there are
fourteen in which more than 25 percent of the stock has been
allocated to management and employees through options.27 Among
the two hundred largest companies, an average of 13.7 percent of
shares is committed to options, and 2.07 percent of equity is granted
annually, with fifteen companies granting more than 5 percent
annually. 28 Moreover, the more a company relies on options as
compensation, the more management may be induced to minimize
the number of shares in public hands so as to keep the stock price
higher. Thus, a company may repurchase shares on the open market
(or may buy call options or sell put options), further enhancing
management's relative stake in the company. Indeed, in 1997, it was
reported that Microsoft (whose stock is 38 percent owned by or
committed to its optionee employees) used cash equal to about two-
thirds of its reported earnings to buy shares and options in order to
control for dilution.29 Alternatively, a company may opt to sell a
relatively small percentage of shares to the public in the first place. In
short, it would appear that there is much less separation of ownership
from control than there was even as recently as 1980.
Quite aside from these quibbles, it appears that there is more
than one kind of stockholder. There are passive investor stock-
holders. And there are active manager stockholders. The interests of
these two groups of stockholders may diverge in significant ways. So,
even if we assume that the stockholders do in fact own the company,
which set of stockholders are we talking about? The stockholder
ownership theory simply cannot answer the question.30
27. PEARL MEYER & PARTNERS, INC., 1999 EQUiTY STAKE 3-7 (1999).
28. Id.
29. Roger Lowenstein, Microsoft and Its Two Constituencies, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 1997, at
C1. It is thus not surprising that the SEC and the NYSE have focused recently on the need for
stronger rules regarding dilution. It may be, however, that one of the reasons for the rise in
relatively small offerings is that they allow for easier control of dilution or indeed allow for the
possibility of going private more cheaply should the need arise.
30. Cf. Smith, supra note 1 (discussing the history of stockholder ownership theory in
conflicts between groups of stockholders).
[Vol. 77:147
WHO OWNS A CORPORATIONAND WHO CARES?
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF CORPORATION LAW
To paraphrase The Talking Heads, how did we get here? To
answer this question one needs to hark back to the heyday of the
stockholder ownership theory. The theory reached its descriptive
apogee in the great takeover wars of the 1980s when innumerable
corporations were sold out from under incumbent management to
bidders who appealed directly to the stockholders by means of the
tender offer. All theorizing aside, stockholders demonstrated that
they could and would sell out to the highest bidder.
There were three factors that drove tender offers. One factor
was the growth of highly diversified mutual funds and other
institutional investors who were essentially risk neutral.31 A second
factor was the development of the junk bond market, which allowed
bidders to raise vast sums of cash.32 The rise of junk bonds was itself
fueled in part by the reluctance of corporations to pay dividends (and
the concomitant misuse of available cash), as well as the recognition
by investors that junk bonds were roughly equivalent to stock (with
an enforceable promise to pay dividends). If the obligor defaulted
there was always the alternative of a prepackaged bankruptcy in
which the holders of junk bonds would at worst get stock-roughly
what they had in the first place. The result of this confluence of
factors was that corporations came under pressure to become more
leveraged. Risk-neutral stockholders loved leverage. Any corpo-
ration that failed to borrow heavily and minimize its stock float saw
its stock languish and likely became a target. The third factor was the
formation during the 1960s and 1970s of numerous conglomerate
corporations.3 Diversified investors developed a distinct distaste for
diversified companies. It was cheaper for investors to diversify than
for companies to do so. Why would investors want prepackaged, off-
the-rack diversification when they could form their own custom
portfolio or choose from thousands of mutual funds? Perhaps even
worse, management of a diversified company tended to be less
focused than that of a company in a single line of business. Bidders
soon discovered that they could often pay off takeover debt by
31. See Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders (or How Investor
Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53 BuS. LAW. 429 (1998).
32. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW
STUDENTS 375-76 (2d ed. 1998).
33. See Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for
Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605 (1981).
20011
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breaking up target companies and selling the pieces for more than the
cost of the whole.
One early reaction to the threat of a hostile takeover was the
golden parachute, an attractive severance package designed to
compensate ousted management for lost jobs. Many commentators
saw golden parachutes as just another managerial abuse, but some
noted that a properly tailored golden parachute would allow
management to consider dispassionately the merits of a takeover bid
from the point of view of the stockholders. 34 But if golden parachutes
are such a good idea, why not further align management and
stockholder interests by granting generous stock options, which (by
the way) could reduce the need for cash compensation and the hit to
earnings and even raise capital for the corporation upon execution.
Hostile takeovers may be less common than they were in the
1980s. The evidence is somewhat equivocal."5 But the market for
corporate control is even more active today than it was in the 1980s.36
Of course, the reasons for mergers and acquisitions have changed
somewhat. Nowadays, consolidation and going global are major
motivations. 37 Nevertheless, the process of deconglomeration that
began with the bust-up takeover of the 1980s is alive and well-
witness the boom in spin-offs and tracking stock.38 In short, the
takeover is not dead. It has just gone in-house. Part of the reason
may be that potential target managers hope to preempt a hostile
takeover. But takeover defenses have become virtually impenetrable.
So why does management so often choose to sell? The simple answer
may be stock options and the increased equity stake that so many
executives have in their companies.
But even if management could be compensated exclusively with
stock, perfect alignment of interests is impossible. Management
interest will always diverge from stockholder interest because
34. Richard A. Booth, Is There Any Valid Reason Why Target Managers Oppose Tender
Offers?, 14 SEC. REG. L.J. 43, 59-60 (1986).
35. See generally John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A
Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271 (2000) [hereinafter Coates, Takeover
Defenses]; John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable
Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837 (1999) [hereinafter Coates, Mediating
Hierarchy].
36. See Coates, Mediating Hierarchy, supra note 35; Coates, Takeover Defenses, supra note
35.
37. See VICTOR BRUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRAT'ON, BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN'S CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 166-67 (4th ed. Supp. 2001).
38. Susan Pulliam, More Parent Firms Are Setting Units Free, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2000, at
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stockholders are free to diversify. With diversification, an investor
can eliminate the risk that some companies in a portfolio will
underperform the market. For every company that underperforms,
there will be another that exceeds expectations. You win some and
you lose some. Only the average really matters.
A diversified stockholder cares little about risk at the company
level. He or she will prefer that management assume extraordinary
risk as long as the return is adequate. If ten companies each bet the
farm on ventures that offer a 50 percent chance at a 100 percent
return, half will succeed and half will fail. The diversified stockholder
will get his expected 50 percent return, but half of the managers will
get nothing (except possibly fired).
Management cannot diversify-at least not until options can be
exercised. Even then, a manager's human capital is invested in a
single venture. Management cannot hedge against the risk of failure.
Thus, although a diversified stockholder may prefer that management
be aggressive about taking on risky new ventures when the potential
return is high, management may prefer a merely adequate return
(and survival of the business) to a chance at a jackpot. The upshot is
that management cares far more about how its company performs
than stockholders do.39
Things were not always so. In the age of conglomerates before
the 1980s, a share of stock in a diversified company was rather like a
share in a mutual fund. Conglomerates do not, however, serve
stockholder interests well. It is much cheaper for stockholders to
diversify than it is for companies to diversify, and stockholders can
easily adjust the mix of companies in which they invest. Moreover,
the CEO of a conglomerate tends to be a jack-of-all-trades but a
master of none. And thus they may lack the "vision thing."4 Finally,
market analysts have a tough time setting a value on a collection of
companies in a wide variety of businesses. For all these reasons, the
market did not like diversified companies. It bid down the price of
such stocks, and most such companies are gone as a result of bust-up
takeovers. But part of the cost of more focused companies is that
managers must be compensated for higher risk. And if options are
part of the compensation package, a CEO must take more risk for the
39. Options are not perfect, but (like democracy) they are better than the alternatives. To
pay management on the basis of an artificial and manipulable number like earnings or assets
invites invidious gaming. See Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1976); see
also Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
40. Thank you George H. W. Bush.
2001]
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same return as a diversified stockholder. It thus stands to reason that
CEOs will negotiate for more options as compensation for added risk,
and that public companies will come increasingly to be owned by
management. 41
Given the profound conflict between the interests of manage-
ment and the interests of stockholders, one wonders why any
company deigns to be publicly traded. Even the very largest
companies can go private. It is not as if the capital available through
the stock market is all that necessary.42 So, to paraphrase George
Bailey in It's a Wonderful Life, why do we have to have all these
stockholders anyway? Ironically, one of the most important reasons
for being publicly held is that it allows for the use of stock options as
compensation for key employees. 43  And even more ironically, a
public market also provides liquidity and allows manager-owners to
achieve some degree of diversification. In other words, it allows them
to bail out. One might even think of management as buying liquidity
from public stockholders. Finally, stock options also have the distinct
41. Yet another way in which the interests of inside and outside stockholders diverge arises
from the fact that companies are not necessarily in control of their own securities. Companies
have no control over whether their stock will be the subject of options trading or will be
stripped and sold in pieces as part of some exotic derivative. And to add insult to injury, many
of these investments (and the strategies they allow) are off-imits to insiders. See, e.g., Securities
Exchange Act § 16(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (2001) (prohibiting short sales by officers, directors,
and stockholders owning greater than 10 percent of any equity security). Moreover, the
addition or subtraction of a stock in an index causes an increase or decrease in price having
nothing to do with the fundamental value of the company. These "wag the dog" phenomena do
not necessarily justify all of the efforts of management to manage the flow of information and
stock price itself, but they do explain such behaviors to some extent. Fpr a notable example of a
case in which the court considered and rejected arguments by stockholders based on their
peculiarly hedged position in a stock, see H. B. Korenvaes Invs., L.P. v. Marriott Corp., 1993
WL 257422, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 1, 1993). On the other hand, insiders are privileged to use
inside information in deciding not to buy or sell. And indeed the SEC rules against insider
trading have been somewhat softened for management stockholders. Compare Securities
Exchange Act Rule lOb5-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2000), and Securities Exchange Act Rule
10b5-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2000), with SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998). It has
also been suggested that one reason for the boom in options is that management is largely free
to coordinate the grant and exercise of options with lows and highs in market price which
themselves are somewhat controllable by management. This view of stock options is similar in
many respects to the position advocated by Henry Manne that management should be free to
engage in insider trading as a form of compensation. See generally HENRY MANNE, INSIDER
TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
42. The massive leveraged buyouts of the 1980s demonstrated this beyond peradventure.
And the concept is apparently alive and well at the turn of the century. See Scott McCartney et
al., Feeling Undervalued, Some Airlines Consider Bumping Stockholders, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10,
2000, at Al; Suzanne McGee, Control Issues: More Firms Turn to LBO Funding, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 14, 2000, at C1. Moreover, statistics demonstrate that in most years, corporations buy back
more shares than they sell in the aggregate as measured in total dollar amount.
43. Joseph B. Treaster, Going Public Amid Sharks: Insurers Look at Stocks as a Means of
Survival, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2000, at 1.
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advantage of providing an objective measure of performance that can
be vital in a large company in which communication can be difficult
and internal rivalries can lead to serious differences of opinion about
how well the company is performing. In other words, beyond a
certain size or level of complexity, a company needs to be publicly
traded.44 In a sense, public trading is a form of dispute resolution.45
Blair and Stout have argued that the board of directors acts as a
mediator among various corporate constituencies. 46 In fact, it appears
that the public stockholders and the market perform this function.
The difference matters. By assuming that the board of directors acts
as a mediator, Blair and Stout effectively assume the conclusion that
the board should consider the interests of other constituencies as well
as stockholders. If the stockholders are in fact the ultimate mediator,
there is no reason to assume that they would or should consider the
interests of other constituencies beyond the four corners of the
contracts defining those interests. To be sure, it is somewhat unusual
to think of a mediator as having an interest in the outcome of a
dispute, which may well have led Blair and Stout to focus on the
typically minimally compensated board of directors. But the idea of
the board of directors as an advisory body that management may use
as a glorified focus group to test out ideas and gauge potential
stockholder reaction is equally believable-and probably more so
given the profound conflict between the interests of management and
stockholders.
In the end, one could think of the notion of stockholders as
mediators as just another way of describing market discipline. The
point is, however, that management submits to the discipline of the
market for its own reasons, not because it necessarily must. The fact
that stockholders may use their power in their own interest-perhaps
to force the sale of the company through a tender offer-is a mere
byproduct. Investors do not seem to care much about acting like
owners, perhaps because they have become more confident that
management will do the right thing. In short, stockholders tend to
behave as if they are just along for the ride.
44. This is consistent with the approach implicit in I.R.C. § 7704 (1994), which mandates
that if a company is publicly traded, it must be taxed as a corporation.
45. See Rebecca Smith, Some See Dark Side in 'Phantom' Stock, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15,
1999, at C1 (discussing constructive stock tied to division performance and used as incentive
compensation).




It is ultimately impossible -in this context or any other for that
matter-to say who is buying and who is selling. And it is unclear
that it makes much difference. It is, however, apparent that
management and the market are adversaries to some extent. At the
very least, they are more akin to parties to an arm's-length bargain
than they are to the traditional principal and agent model implicit in
the stockholder ownership theory. And when one looks for it,
additional evidence that managers and the market are engaged in a
somewhat adversarial bargain is fairly easy to find.
A. Initial Public Offerings
It is a well-known anomaly of corporation finance that initial
public offerings ("IPOs") tend to be underpriced. 7 To be sure, much
of the gain is often dissipated in the days and weeks that follow.
Indeed, investors who buy newly offered shares in the aftermarket
(rather than receiving an allocation from their broker at the offering
price) often end up with a loss. 48 Nevertheless, on the average and
over the long haul, IPOs tend to rise from their offering price by more
than other shares of similar risk.49
One would think that the existing shareholders of companies
going public would be outraged at the failure of their investment
bankers to do a better job at setting prices for IPOs. But it appears
that existing shareholders are quite happy when the stock soars
following an IPO, despite the fact that a big pop in price would
suggest that the company could have raised more capital for the same
number of shares. 0 The explanation may be that although the
company could have raised more money, the shareholders see the
value of their own stock skyrocket. Nevertheless, the company (and
47. See Jonathan A. Shayne & Larry D. Soderquist, Inefficiency in the Market for Initial
Public Offerings, 448 VAND. L. REV. 965, 965-66 (1995).
48. Id; see also Terzah Ewing, Burnt Offerings?: Street Debuts Are Fizzling After Pop,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2000, at Cl.
49. See RICHARD W. JENNINGS ETAL., SECURITIES REGULATION 96-97 (8th ed. 1998)
(collecting studies). Although IPOs carry above-market returns based on the offering price, it
appears that they carry below-market returns when bought at the first-day closing price. Id. My
own study of thirty-four IPOs during the month of October 1999 indicates that on average these
offerings closed up 91.59 percent on the first day of trading.
50. See Robert McGough & Randall Smith, IPO Issuers Don't Mind Money Left on the
Table, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1999, at Cl; Timothy J. Mullaney, Is the Street Lowballing IPOs?,
BUS. WK., Apr. 3, 2000, at EB112.
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presumably the existing stockholders' stock) would be worth that
much more if it had sold its stock at a higher price.51
Arguably, competition should take care of the problem of under-
pricing. Underwriters should compete with one another to sell an
issuer's stock at the highest possible price. Underwriters have every
incentive to maximize offering price. With the standard flat-rate
discount of 7 percent, the underwriter stands to make more money at
a higher offering price.52 Indeed, in recent years, several new firms
have sought to develop ways to capture the benefit of underpricing
for their issuer clients.53 The results have been mixed at best.54
Numerous explanations have been offered for the apparently
systematic under pricing of IPOs. But there has been relatively little
investigation of whether the extent of under pricing can be correlated
with the terms of the underwriting. The question is: Are there any
identifiable factors that cause the market to bid up the price of some
IPOs more than others?
A number of scholars have sought to show that there is a con-
nection between anti-takeover provisions in the corporation charter
and the success of an offering. 55 Consistent with their findings, my
original hypothesis was that a company that sells a relatively large
51. Raymond Hennessey, Start-Ups Still Fail to Benefit Fully as IPO Prices Soar, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 28, 2000, at C21. One might think that the corporation (or the selling shareholders) may
have a claim against the underwriters who (after all) serve as agents for the issuer. Invariably,
however, these claims are waived by both the corporation and the existing shareholders as part
of the underwriting agreement. And given that no one has standing to sue for an injury to the
corporation unless he or she was a shareholder at the time of the wrong, there is no one left who
can sue the underwriter unless the waiver is found to be invalid for some reason.
52. Competition works slowly in the underwriting market. Issuers seldom switch
underwriters. It is possible, however, that underwriters compete on the basis of reputation at a
much earlier stage and that some underwriters get better prices for their offerings. See
Mullaney, supra note 50, at EB112 (reporting that many firms switch underwriters for follow-on
offerings possibly because of underpricing of IPO); Michael Siconolfi, More Firms Switch
Underwriters, WALL ST. J., December 19, 1996, at Cl; see also Randall Smith & Thomas T.
Vogel Jr., Time Warner Muscles Its Underwriters, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1993, at C1 (reporting
that Time Warner was able to dictate terms of a series of deals because of competition among
underwriters seeking the business).
53. Anthony B. Perkins, IPOs Go Dutch, and Small Investors Gain, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27,
1999, at A18. In addition, there are numerous alternatives to underwritten offerings ranging
from do-it-yourself sales over the internet to outright stock giveaways. See generally Denis T.
Rice, Recent Developments in Offering Securities on the Internet, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF
DEVELOPMENTS IN BUSINESS FINANCING 1 (Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Bus. Law, Comm. on
Devs. in Bus. Fin. ed., 2000).
54. For example, Wit Capital and W. R. Hambrecht & Co. have used the internet to
conduct Dutch Auction offerings with some success. See Terzah Ewing, Too Hot an IPO?:
Andover.net's 252% Pop Raises Questions About Underwriter's 'Dutch Auction,' WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 9, 1999, at Cl; Randall Smith, So Far, 'E-Underwriting' Gets a Slow Start, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 13, 1999, at Cl.
55. See Coates, Takeover Defenses, supra note 35, at 276 n.8.
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proportion of its shares in an IPO is likely to see a larger increase in
its share price in the aftermarket because it exposes itself to the threat
of takeover and thereby vouches (in effect) for the confidence that it
has in its own prospects.
As it turns out, however, precisely the opposite appears to be
true. My research, based on IPOs occurring during October 1999,
indicates that there is an inverse correlation between offering size (as
a percentage of shares retained by or for insiders) and the size of the
first-day increase (pop) in stock price. In other words, smaller
offerings increase more in the first day of trading than do larger
offerings.
One possible explanation for why smaller percentage offerings
show a bigger first day pop is simple supply and demand. 6 In other
words, the fewer shares that are offered, the more intense the
competition for them. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that
downward-sloping demand may explain underpricing of IPOs
generally.57 That is, given that IPOs are typically sold in a fixed-price
offering, the price of the offering must be set low enough to induce
the nth investor to buy. And given that the stock must be widely
distributed (both legally and practically), it seems likely that many
optimistic investors will get fewer shares than they would like to get.
It is not clear, however, why supply and demand should work
disproportionately in favor of smaller offerings. Moreover, one
would think that the absolute number of shares available would be
more important than the percentage of shares offered. Another
possible explanation is that the small size of an offering signals to the
market that management has a high level of confidence in the
business and wants to retain more shares for itself or for a subsequent
offering at a presumably higher price. 8 Neither of these theories
explains why an underwriter would fail to adjust the price of a smaller
offering proportionately upward so as to avoid excessive underpricing.
56. See Floyd Norris & Lawrence M. Fisher, Offspring Outweighs Parent as Offering Hits
the Market, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2000, at C1 (describing the offering by 3Com of shares in Palm,
Inc., a 94 percent subsidiary after the offering, and stating that "[t]he soaring price for Palm
partly reflected the fact that less than 5 percent of the outstanding shares in Palm were available
for trading, far from enough to satisfy investor demand"); see also Terzah Ewing & Joshua
Harris Prager, Many Are Finding IPOs Still Out of Reach, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2000, at C21
(discussing the difficulty of small investors in getting access to IPO shares).
57. See Richard A. Booth, The Efficient Market, Portfolio Theory, and the Downward
Sloping Demand Hypothesis, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1187 (1993).
58. See Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of
Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807 (1987) (discussing the distinction between growth companies
and cash cows).
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One would think that underwriters would consider the quantity of
stock to be sold in pricing the issue in the first place.59
In any event, if one assumes that an IPO will be underpriced, it
clearly makes sense for a company to offer as few shares as it possibly
can to establish a market price, and then sell more shares in a follow-
on offering once the market price is established.60 In other words,
smaller offerings may themselves be a reaction to underpricing. Still,
it is surprising that investors have been so eager to buy into such
small offerings even though there is no guarantee that the company
will sell more shares in a follow-on offering.
B. Other Offerings
There are several other anomalous phenomena that may be
related to the market's apparent taste for smaller offerings. First,
follow-on secondary offerings (offerings by selling shareholders
rather than by the issuing company) tend to perform better than
offerings in which the money actually goes to the company.61 This
finding is somewhat counterintuitive in that one would think investors
would be suspicious of offerings by which existing shareholders seek
to bail out of their own investments rather than to raise money for the
company. On the other hand, it may be that investors are suspicious
of companies that need equity capital. Perhaps investors figure that a
company with good prospects ought to be able to raise capital
59. It is possible that as of October 1999, underwriters had not figured out downward
sloping demand and how to adjust for it in connection with relatively small offerings, but it
seems unlikely. The Dutch Auction is founded on the notion that the quantity offered is
inversely related to the market-clearing price. The Dutch Auction has been around for years
and has been used extensively in connection with issuer repurchases since the early 1980s.
Moreover, the Dutch Auction model has more recently been used by Wit Capital and
Hambrecht & Company precisely in an effort to avoid underpricing in connection with IPOs. In
short, it is inconceivable that underwriters are not aware that quantity is arguably a key factor in
establishing the offering price. Indeed, some stock exchanges require that a minimum
percentage of shares be offered to the public presumably for this very reason. There are two
other possible explanations for excessive underpricing of smaller percentage offerings. First, it
may be that investors assume more risk that the price will be incorrect if the offering is
relatively small or that underwriters find it more difficult to price such offerings and that a
bigger discount is therefore required to be built into the price. Second, the practice of portfolio
weighting according to market capitalization may create disproportionate demand for smaller
percentage offerings.
60. Suzanne McGee & Terzah Ewing, 'Piggyback' Deals: Keys to Unlock Insiders' IPO
Stakes, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2000, at Cl.
61. See Lyn Perlmuth, How to Predict a Stock's Decline, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept.
1996, at 35 (reporting on a study by Inmoo Lee finding that among seasoned equity offerings
("SEOs"), companies offering additional stock by selling shareholders perform better than
companies issuing new stock); see also Danielle Sessa & Terzah Ewing, Some Insiders Sell
Shares at Time of IPO, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1999, at Cl.
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privately or in the debt market, and therefore establishing a trading
market for the company's shares is the most believable reason for
going public. 62
Second, several companies in recent years have sought to give
away their stock for free or in exchange for minimal consideration,
such as visiting an internet site or registering with it.63 Stock
giveaways seem to confirm that there is value in excess of the market
beyond the capital one can raise in a public offering.64 It may be that
some entrepreneurs figure that they must pay to become publicly
traded anyway (in the form of fees, expenses, discounts, and
underpricing). Why not simply give away an amount of stock equal to
these costs? It is always possible, after all, that one can establish a
legitimate public market at a lower cost. Thus, another possible
explanation for the excess price increase of smaller offerings is that
the market charges a more or less fixed amount for liquidity. If so,
one would expect this liquidity charge to be a larger proportion of
smaller offerings.
Third, in many of the IPOs in the October 1999 sample, the
offering consisted of lesser voting stock. Yet voting rights do not
seem to affect the market reception for the stock, suggesting that
investors do not particularly care about voting rights or the potential
for a change in control.65 Similarly, the market has been quite
62. It may also be the case that many secondary offerings are made by venture capital
investors and that their earlier involvement with the company signals to the market that the
company's prospects are better. Indeed, studies indicate that IPOs of companies backed by
venture capital investors do better in the aftermarket over the long haul. That is, the IPOs of
such companies are less underpriced at the time of offering but do better in the months that
follow. See Christopher B. Barry et al., The Role of Venture Capital in the Creation of Public
Companies: Evidence from the Going Public Process, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 447 (1990); Alon Brav &
Paul A. Gompers, Myth or Reality? The Long-Run Underperformance of Initial Public
Offerings: Evidence from Venture and Non Venture Capital Backed Companies, 52 J. FIN. 1791
(1997). It is far from clear what significance to attach to aftermarket performance. It may be
that a significant immediate increase in price indicates that the market perceived more risk in
the offering and thus required a bigger premium (or bribe) to buy the stock. In other words,
one could argue that a bigger pop indicates a lesser quality stock. Nevertheless, the
stockholders enjoy a better return in the short term.
63. See Denis T. Rice, Free Stock on the Internet Is Not a Menace, INSIGHTS, Oct. 1999, at 8;
Scott Thurm, SEC Questions Start-Ups' Cheap Stock Sales to Customers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26,
2000, at Cl (discussing the use of a supplier company's warrants of its stock to entice buyers to
buy from the supplier company, the result of which is an overstatement of the supplier
company's earnings); Gregory Zuckerman, SEC Clears Web Firms' Stock Giveaway, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 16, 1999, at C1.
64. This is not necessarily an internet phenomenon. Rather, it has only been made
practical by the internet. For an older example of a similar practice, see SEC v. Datronics
Engineers, Inc., 490 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1973).
65. Ronald Gilson has suggested that lesser voting stock may not matter in the context of a
growth company because management interests are similar to shareholder interests. Gilson,
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receptive to tracking stock even though it represents an interest in a
line of business that is utterly captive to a larger corporation.66
In summary, it appears that smaller offerings and investor recep-
tivity to them may be part of a larger trend away from the classical
public corporation.6 Nevertheless, although it is easy enough to see
why management may be interested in minimizing the control power
of public shareholders, it is not as easy to see why investors are willing
to give up the power that they have traditionally had. The answer
may lie in the rather remarkable evolution of the relationship
between investors and managers over the last twenty years and, in
particular, the phenomenal growth in the use of stock options and
other forms of equity compensation.
C. Poison Pills
In the end, the only reason that we say that a corporation is
owned by its stockholders is that they may vote on a limited number
of matters and, in theory, can sell the company out from under
management. One might argue also that the shareholders own the
company because they stand last in line financially and are entitled to
all the leftovers when the company dissolves. The problem is that
solvent companies rarely (if ever) dissolve. Of course, the stock-
holders may also benefit financially if the company pays dividends or
repurchases its stock, but there is no legal requirement that the
company undertake any such distributions.68 And indeed fewer and
fewer companies choose to pay dividends.69
supra note 58. See also Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the
Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 11 (1988). Ironically, lesser voting stock
would not have been a possibility before the adoption of Securities Exchange Act Rule 19c-4, 17
C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (2001), an SEC rule designed to protect shareholder democracy, which was
subsequently struck down in Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990), as
beyond the authority of the SEC. Before the adoption of the rule, a company with lesser voting
stock could not be listed on the NYSE. Thus, practically speaking, a company that aspired to be
listed on the NYSE at some later point would have needed to comply with NYSE rules or
undergo a messy recapitalization before being listed on the NYSE. Under the rule, a listed
company could not reduce the voting rights of outstanding shares and remain listed on a
national securities exchange, but a company could issue lesser voting (or nonvoting) stock in the
first place and still be listed.
66. See Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098 (Del. Ch. 1999); In re Gen. Motors Class H
S'holders Litig., 734 A.2d 611 (Del. Ch. 1999) (discussing lack of control rights and built-in
conflicts of interest in connection with tracking stock).
67. Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct.
1989, at 61.
68. But see Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 NW. 668 (Mich. 1919) (holding that a company
must pay a dividend where it has declared that it has no other use for the funds). There are also
many cases to the contrary involving closely held corporations, but for the most part these cases
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Thus, the vote appears to be what counts. But many (if not
most) of the largest companies have adopted poison pills. And those
that do not have a pill probably can adopt one in short order. 70 Still
other companies may be incorporated in states that have control
share statutes that operate as the equivalent of a poison pill.71 And in
an increasing number of companies, management controls a working
majority of the shares or the votes.71 Studies seem to indicate that
poison pills do not have much if any negative effect on stock price,
which further suggests that stockholders do not much care about the
vote. 73 To be sure, the evidence is equivocal because every company
may potentially adopt a pill. Moreover, there do not seem to have
been any fewer hostile takeovers in the 1990s after the advent of the
pill than there were in the 1980s when the legality of the pill was
somewhat in doubt.74 But this may be because the courts have been
willing to order pills withdrawn when there is no threat of stockholder
coercion.75  And given that the merger market in the 1990s far
surpassed that of the 1980s in both numbers of deals and dollar value,
it is unclear what we should make of a relatively flat rate of hostile
takeovers.
Clearly, the poison pill has increased management rights relative
to stockholder rights. We are very close to a requirement that a
bidder deal with management or not at all. Does that mean that
management owns the company? Not quite. But it does seem to
suggest that stockholder rights were more extensive in (say) 1980 than
it turns out they should have been. It hardly seems consistent with
the stockholder ownership model that stockholder rights may be
reduced by management without stockholder consent.
deal with attempts by controlling stockholders to pay themselves disguised dividends in the
form of an enhanced salary or other perquisites while denying similar benefits to the minority.
69. See Kenneth N. Gilpin, The Dividend Check Isn't in the Mail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001,
§ 3, at 10; Floyd Norris, In 2000, Fewer Companies Paid Dividends to Investors and More of the
Same Lies Ahead, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 3,2001, at C9; Mark Hulbert, Explaining Away the Dividend
Yield, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2000, § 3, at 7; Floyd Norris, Growing Number of Companies Choose
Not to Offer Dividends, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2000, at Al.
70. See Coates, Mediating Hierarchy, supra note 35; Coates, Takeover Defenses, supra note
35, at 287-88.
71. See generally Richard A. Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 1635 (1988).
72. See PEARL MEYER & PARTNERS, INC., supra note 27, at 3-7.
73. See Coates, Mediating Hierarchy, supr'a note 35; Coates, Takeover Defenses, supra note
35.
74. Coates, Takeover Defenses, supra note 35, at 276-77
75. See Quicktum Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
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The real question is, are we better off than we were in 1980?
Perhaps. To the extent that a pill allows management to focus more
intensely on business rather than corporate warfare, it may be
consistent with the interests of diversified stockholders in attracting
and retaining management. Thus, it may be important for a company
that relies heavily on stock options as compensation to protect itself
from takeover. The question is whether a diversified stockholder is
better served by stock options or the market for corporate control.
The answer is far from clear.76
Although the stockholders can in theory force the sale of the
company, in practice they really only have veto power. The
stockholders can dispose, but they cannot propose. That is not
nothing, but then again it is not exactly ownership either.
It is worth noting that the story of the poison pill clearly suggests
that corporation law matters (and by implication, so does theory).
Pills are legal and thus any company that does not have one can
probably adopt one in short order (assuming it has enough authorized
stock). Although we may sometimes be able to tell by event studies
that a particular change in the laws of a single state or the terms of a
single corporate charter is good or bad for stockholders, it is
impossible to do so when the change affects the entire market as it
does (practically speaking) when Delaware speaks. Thus, it is
important that we get it right.
To be sure, the courts are ready to review the terms of a pill
should it be triggered, but this too suggests an important role for law
and theory. Indeed, the big worry about the pill has been that on its
face it seems virtually bulletproof. Before the pill (and state takeover
laws), the threat of takeover was there to keep management on its
toes. And the beauty of that system was that it was self-executing.
We still have takeovers, but now it is the courts rather than the
market that say whether a takeover will proceed. In effect, the
burden has shifted from target management to justify a takeover
defense, to the bidder to argue why it should be lifted.
76. One might even argue that stock options have an intellectual property component and
that there is an implicit requirement that the optionee be given a good faith opportunity to
realize a profit. On the other hand, in practice many option plans provide for acceleration in
the event of a takeover. It does not appear that any cases have arisen in which the threat to
optionees has been credited as a reason not to withdraw a poison pill, but the argument has a
good deal of merit, not because optionees are stockholders (they are not) but rather because
undermining the compensation system may be bad for morale and thus bad for stockholders.
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D. Sales of Control
Yet another feature of US corporation law that casts doubt on
the stockholder ownership model is the fact that a controlling
stockholder is generally free to sell control at a premium and without
sharing the premium with the remaining stockholders, provided that
the premium does not come at the expense of the minority.77 The rule
is generally different elsewhere in the world. Indeed, in most
countries the transfer of more than 20 or 30 percent of the stock of a
company triggers a right in the remaining stockholders to sell their
stock at the same price (although not necessarily for the same kind of
consideration) .78
Which rule makes more sense? The equal opportunity rule
clearly prevents a form of looting (though there are many other ways
to loot a corporation). But the price is that legitimate transfers of
control by controlling stockholders are precluded unless the buyer is
willing and able to buy all of the stock. On the other hand, one could
argue-on a theory akin to conservation of matter and energy-that a
control premium must somehow come out of the pocket of the
minority. The US rule seems to presume that there are other sources
of value. Clearly, there are other sources of value in that a control-
ling stockholder is free to manage the company within a wide range of
possibilities. Indeed, the controlling stockholder may in theory
dictate a strategy for purely personal reasons as long as the strategy is
within the range of legitimate possibilities. Thus, in a country where
money-losing sports franchises sell for hundreds of millions of dollars,
it should not be surprising that someone is willing to pay for control.
Still, one could argue, as have some courts, that control itself is
somehow a corporate asset or is held in trust for all of the stock-
holders. And that leads back to a rule of equal treatment.7 9
The sale of control example arguably supports the notion that
the stockholders own the company and suggests instead that the real
myth is that of stockholder equality. Indeed, not even under the non-
77. See, e.g., Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436 (Del. 1996).
78. See Adam 0. Emmerich & David E. Shapiro, Poison Pill Approaches Its 15th Birthday:
Responses of Other Jurisdictions Support Evidence of Beneficial Effects of Shareholder Rights
Plans, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 15, 1999, at S8.
79. In a classic and groundbreaking 1974 article, Brudney and Chirelstein argued that the
idea of fairness is indeterminate in a world in which fair price is a range of values and that in the
absence of a better rule, merger gains should be split equally. Victor Brudney & Marvin A.
Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974).
They were right about the premise, but not about the implication.
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US rule do stockholders have true equality in that they can be paid in
stock or notes when the seller of control receives all cash. But in
some sense they are more equal than minority stockholders in US
corporations. Similarly, US corporation law allows for differential
compensation in a merger or other fundamental change. 80 Tracking
stock also suggests that stockholders are happy with contractually
defined rights that differ from those of other investors.,
In any event, the trusteeship theory is somewhat different from
the stockholder ownership theory. Under trust law, a trustee owns
the corpus of the trust but can have no beneficial interest in it.82 Thus,
the trusteeship theory proves too much. We have no rule against
manager ownership. Quite to the contrary, we tend to bemoan the
lack of manager ownership (even as it evolves away).83 Although the
notion that managers are trustees was once quite popular, it sounds
almost corny now. No one thinks of managers as trustees (except
perhaps some managers who always sound as if they are engaged in
an elaborate rationalization when they talk about it). Indeed, it is
doubtful that stockholders would be favorably impressed by such talk.
On the other hand, the notion of trusteeship does speak to a distinct
worry: How can we rationalize the idea that corporations control vast
amounts of wealth if we do not tell ourselves that the corporation is
somehow imbued with a public interest that extends beyond
management and perhaps even the stockholders?
IV. FINDERS KEEPERS
The law of sales of control suggests that there is another possible
model. Simply put, under this model controlling shareholders and
management are largely free to appropriate value to themselves as
long as to do so does not decrease the wealth of the remaining
stockholders. As it turns out, this appears to be the rule in other
80. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 11.06(a)(6) & cmt. background (1985).
81. As Judge Frank Easterbrook has stated, markets work best when they span all the
possibilities. Chi. Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989). In other words,
investors prefer choice.
82. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 16A (1957) ("Trustee Distinguished From
Corporate Officer or Director"); id. at § 170 ("Duty of Loyalty").
83. On the other hand, in some arenas we also seem to think that a financial interest may
adversely affect one's judgment. Thus, the big five accounting firms have been under pressure
to limit or divest their consulting practices, which is not to mention the absolute rule against
investing in audit clients. And some would argue that it is wrong for lawyers to invest in their
clients or to accept equity as a fee notwithstanding that the role of lawyer as a zealous advocate
is quite different from the role of the auditor as an independent monitor.
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areas as well. It is the rule in Delaware for determining whether a
controversy triggers duty of loyalty analysis.84 Some such thinking
may also explain the recent statutory repeal of the corporate
opportunity doctrine in Delaware. 85  And it may be the ultimate
explanation for the no-win exception to the business judgment rule.86
It also describes the practice in connection with stock options. That
is, stockholders seem to tolerate seemingly gigantic pay packages
apparently without punishing companies that allow management in
effect to appropriate large amounts of supposed stockholder wealth.87
It may be that the stockholders reckon in effect that they are better
off as stockholders because management is well paid even if
management keeps more than its arguable share of the wealth.
Indeed, as long as management agrees to accept stock as its primary
form of compensation, it is hard to imagine that management would
ever intentionally award itself so much in options that stock price
would be adversely affected. 8
In contrast, the trigger for the duty of loyalty under the Model
Business Corporation Act ("MBCA") is merely that a director have a
financial interest in the transaction that would reasonably be
expected to exert an influence on the director's judgment.89 The ALl
Principles of Corporate Governance ("PCG") is somewhat closer to
the Delaware rule in that the duty of fair dealing arises only if the
transaction is one in which a financial interest would reasonably be
expected to affect the judgment of an officer or director in a manner
adverse to the corporation. 90
The distinction between the approaches of Delaware and the
MBCA is roughly parallel to the distinction in economics between
Pareto optimality and Pareto superiority.91 A Pareto superior move is
one in which someone is made better off and no one is made worse
84. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d
218 (Del. 1976); see generally Mary Siegel, The Erosion of the Law of Controlling Shareholders,
24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (1999).
85. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17) (2000).
86. Booth, supra note 31, at 429.
87. See Lowenstein, supra note 29 (reporting that during the previous fiscal year Microsoft
had used cash equal to two-thirds of its earnings to buy options and repurchase stock to offset
dilution from compensatory stock options).
88. Richard A. Booth, Seven Myths About Stock Options, DIRECrORS & BOARDS,
Summer 1999, at 35.
89. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.60 (1985).
90. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 1.23 (1994).
91. ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS 38-42 (1990); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-14 (3d ed. 1986).
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off. A Pareto optimal move is one from which no further Pareto
superior moves are possible. In other words, after a Pareto superior
move, everyone is as well off as can be.92
To be sure, the notion that management and controlling stock-
holders may be motivated primarily by self-enrichment is contrary to
much caselaw. But it is clearly tolerated in many circumstances as
long as no damage is done to the remaining stockholders.93 And, a
fortiori, it is tolerated where the stockholders also gain from the
transaction. In fairness, the rule seems to be that if the gain can be
shared it should be shared.94 In other words, what the stockholders
own is a right to an equal share of the shareable returns from
corporate level transactions subject to a wide variety of dilutive
transactions.
Despite all the talk about how the stockholders own the com-
pany, there is really no statutory authority for the proposition.
Indeed, aside from caselaw, only the PCG has ventured into the area
and what it has to say is entirely consistent with the finders keepers
norm: "a corporation should have as its objective the conduct of
business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and
shareholder gain."95
If the stockholders do not own the corporation, then how does
one make sense of the Revlon doctrine (i.e., that once a corporation is
for sale the board must maximize stockholder value)? One possible
answer is that the real goal of the courts is not stockholder wealth
maximization but rather preservation of market discipline.96
92. Professor Coates makes a similar point in the context of the appraisal remedy. See
John C. Coates IV, "Fair Value" as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in
Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1321-25 (1999). Although some might say that
a Pareto optimal move makes everyone better off, that is not absolutely necessary. On the
other hand, John Rawls argued in A Theory of Justice that any decision that makes the better
off still better off should be tolerated only if it also makes someone who is worse off somewhat
better off. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 52-65 (rev. ed. 1999). One might call this
Rawlsian superiority and indeed it could be argued that much of corporation law reflects such
an aspiration if not the imposition of such a rule in some notable cases.
93. See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180
(Del. 1988).
94. See Richard A. Booth, The Business Purpose Doctrine and the Limits of Equal
Treatment in Corporation Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 853 (1984).
95. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 2.01.
96. As I have argued elsewhere, this is consistent with the idea that management owes a
duty to the corporation rather than the stockholders. Booth, supra note 31, at 429.
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V. So WHAT?
The ultimate question is, what difference does it make whether
or not we think of the corporation as being owned by the stock-
holders? Potentially plenty. Each of the above examples of
situations in which stockholder ownership does not seem to hold is
potentially a case in which it might matter whether the court
subscribes to stockholder ownership theory or some more flexible
view of corporate identity.
Aside from these examples, however, the question of who owns a
corporation is clearly relevant in defining the limits of the duty to
maximize stockholder wealth, the details of which are still being
worked out in the courts. The question has arisen repeatedly in the
last few years in the context of the appraisal remedy.
Most courts seem to agree that it is inappropriate to apply a
minority discount in the context of an appraisal proceeding.,, As the
Delaware Supreme Court has stated, the goal of an appraisal
proceeding should be to determine the value of the corporation as a
whole, not the value of particular shares, and to award the found
value per share to all dissenting stockholders. 98 Minority stockholders
97. The leading Delaware case is Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989),
which involved appraisal proceedings following a short form merger. See also Swope v. Siegel-
Robert, Inc., 243 F.3d. 486 (8th Cir. 2001) (merger to form S Corporation under Missouri law);
Morrow v. Martschink, 922 F. Supp. 1093 (D.S.C. 1995) (purchase in lieu of dissolution); Brown
v. Allied Corrugated Box Co., 154 Cal Rptr. (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (purchase in lieu of
dissolution); Blitch v. Peoples Bank, 540 S.E.2d 667 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); G&N Aircraft, Inc. v.
Boehm, 743 N.E.2d 227 (Ind. 2001) (dissolution; minority discount inappropriate because it
would create majority premium); Sieg Co. v. Kelly, 568 N.W.2d 794 (Iowa 1997) (merger);
Arnaud v. Stockgrowers State Bank of Ashland, 992 P.2d 216 (Kan. 1999) (reverse stock split);
In re Valuation of Common Stock of McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d 997 (Me. 1989) (merger); MT
Props., Inc. v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 481 N.W.2d 383 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (merger);
Hansen v. 75 Ranch Co., 957 P.2d 32 (Mont. 1998) (sale of assets); Rigel Corp. v. Cutchall, 511
N.W.2d 519 (Neb. 1994) (merger); Friedman v. Beway Realty Corp., 661 N.E.2d 972 (N.Y.
1995) (sale of assets); Woolf v. Universal Fid. Life Ins. Co., 849 P.2d 1093 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992)
(appraisal in connection with amendments); Charland v. Country View Golf Club, Inc., 588
A.2d 609 (R.I. 1991) (purchase in lieu of dissolution); First W. Bank Wall v. Olsen, 621 N.W.2d
611 (S.D. 2001) (merger to form S Corporation); In re 75,629 Shares of Common Stock of Trapp
Family Lodge, Inc., 725 A.2d 927 (Vt. 1999); Waller v. Am. Int'l Distrib. Corp., 706 A.2d 460
(Vt. 1997) (oppression); Prentiss v. WesSpur, Inc., No. 36321-2-1, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 637
(Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1997) (oppression); HMO-W Inc. v. SSM Health Care Sys., 598
N.W.2d 577 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (merger).
98. Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989); accord Paskill Corp. v.
Alcoma Corp., 747 A.2d 549 (Del. 2000); see Philip Saunders, Jr., Control Premiums and
Minority Discounts, in ROBERT B. DICKIE, FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS AND BUSINESS
VALUATION FOR THE PRACTICAL LAWYER 103 (1998); Coates, supra note 92; James Edward
Harris, Valuation of Closely Held Partnerships and Corporations: Recent Developments
Concerning Minority Interest and Lack of Marketability Discounts, 42 ARK. L. REV. 649 (1989);
Mary Siegel, Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 79 (1995); John D. Emory, Jr., Comment, The Role of Discounts in Determining "Fair
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are still stockholders. The shares they own are legally equal to each
and every other share of the same class. The fact that they cannot
exercise control is no reason to assign minority shares a lesser value
than other shares. Thus, a dissenting shareholder should ordinarily
receive a pro rata share of the value of the corporation without any
discount simply because the minority lacks control.99
But does this mean that a minority shareholder is also entitled to
a share of the control value of the corporation? That is, should an
appraisal court determine the per share price at which a controlling
shareholder could sell control and then award that amount per share
to dissenting stockholders? Surprisingly, several courts that have
Value" Under Wisconsin's Dissenters' Rights Statutes: The Case for Discounts, 1995 Wis. L. REV.
1155; Thomas D. Hall, Comment, Valuing Closely Held Stock: Control Premiums and Minority
Discounts, 31 EMORY L.J. 139 (1982); Michael R. Schwenk, Note, Valuation Problems in the
Appraisal Remedy, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 649 (1994). On the other hand, there is a significant
number of courts that have ruled that a discount may be appropriate usually as a reflection of
the thin market for the shares in question. See Hernando Bank v. Huff, 609 F. Supp. 1124 (N.D.
Miss. 1985) (merger; minority discount proper), affd, 796 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1986) (investment
value based in part on market price was proper measure; use of comparables from merger cases
improperly included control premium); Perlman v. Permonite Mfg. Co., 568 F. Supp. 222 (N.D.
Ind. 1983) (merger); M Life Ins. Co. v. Sapers & Wallack Ins. Agency, Inc., No. 99CA0847, 2001
Colo. App. LEXIS 166 (Colo. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2001) (merger; minority discount does not apply
but marketability discount may apply); Atlantic States Constr., Inc. v. Beavers, 314 S.E.2d 245
(Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (merger); Stanton v. Republic Bank of S. Chi., 581 N.E.2d 678 (I11. 1991)
(merger); Ford v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 639 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (sale of
assets); Advanced Communication Design, Inc. v. Follett, 615 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 2000);
McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (purchase in lieu
of dissolution); Hall v. King, 675 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (purchase in lieu of dissolution);
Garttman v. Picoma Indus., Inc., No. 88-CIV-061, 1993 WL 4175 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 5, 1993)
(merger); Columbia Mgmt. Co. v. Wyss, 765 P.2d 207 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (appraisal in
connection with amendment); Blasingame v. Am. Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. 1983)
(damages for breach of employment contract including agreement to issue stock). Compare
Lawson Mardon Wheaton, Inc. v. Smith, 716 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998)
(dissenters exploited restructuring undertaken for tax advantages; marketability discount
upheld), rev'd, 734 A.2d 738 (N.J. 1999) (no extraordinary circumstances present), with
Balsamides v. Protameen Chems., Inc., 734 A.2d 721 (N.J. 1999) (marketability discount
appropriate in buyout ordered in dissolution proceeding because shares will remain illiquid);
compare Walter S. Cheeseman Realty Co. v. Moore, 770 P.2d 1308 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988)
(voluntary dissolution; no discount), with WCM Indus., Inc. v. Trs. of the Harold G. Wilson
1985 Revocable Trust, 948 P.2d 36 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997) (merger; discount discretionary);
compare Dreiseszun v. FLM Indus., Inc., 577 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (sale of assets
followed by tender offer for minority shares; no discount), with King v. F.T.J., Inc., 765 S.W.2d
301 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (merger; discount permitted).
99. A minority discount may clearly be appropriate where the corporation is not a party to
the transaction in question and the issue is what could the shares fetch on the open market (such
as valuation for estate tax purposes). HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 32, at § 8.15 (2d ed.
1998); see Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237; Righter v. United States, 439 F.2d 1204 (Ct. Cl.
1971); Rattee v. Rattee, 767 A.2d 415 (N.H. 2001); Mary Louise Fellows & William H. Painter,
Valuing Close Corporations for Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes: A Statutory Solution to the
Disappearing Wealth Syndrome, 30 STAN. L. REV. 895, 903-04 (1978); Annotation, Valuation of
Closely Held Stock for Federal Estate Tax Purposes Under Section 2031 (b) of Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 (26 USCA § 2031 (b)) and Implementing Regulations, 22 A.L.R. Fed. 31 (1975).
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addressed the question have so ruled. 1°° What is even more surprising
is that many of the cases have involved transactions such as cashout
mergers in which there is no sale of control. In such a case, the award
of a control premium may require a controlling shareholder to pay
twice for control.
In retrospect, it is fairly easy to see how the courts came effec-
tively to presume that a control premium should routinely be added
as an element of value. The problem can be traced back to 1983,
when the Delaware Supreme Court handed down its landmark
decision in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,1 1 ruling, among other things,
that appraisal should typically be the exclusive remedy in a dispute
over fairness of merger price and that an appraisal court (consistent
with the 1981 amendments to DGCL § 262) should consider all
relevant factors in determining value. Thus, the court held that an
appraisal court should consider any techniques or methods that are
generally acceptable in the financial community. Specifically, the
Weinberger court held that the appraisal court should consider
100. See M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513 (Del. 1999); Nebel v.
Southwest Bancorp, Inc., No. 13618, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 80 (Del. Ch. July 5, 1995) (related
case based on breach of fiduciary duty); Rapid-Am. Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796 (Del. 1992);
Borruso v. Communications Telesystems Int'l, 753 A.2d 451 (Del. Ch. 1999) (adding 30 percent
control premium because comparable company analysis reflects inherent minority discount);
Hintmann v. Fred Weber, Inc., No. 12839, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 26 (Del. Ch. Feb. 17, 1998) (20
percent premium added to value of subsidiary shares). But see M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert,
731 A.2d 790, 797 (Del. 1999) (offers to purchase need not be given any weight in absence of
evidence that they relate to going concern value of company, "fair merger price in the context of
a breach of fiduciary duty claim will not always be a fair value in the context of determining
going concern value"); Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., No. 11107, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS
75 (Del. Ch. June 15, 1995) (affirming addition of premium to market price to adjust for
inherent minority discount but disallowing portion attributable to merger gain). See also
Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co., No. 7244, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91 (Del. Ch. June 8, 1993)
(rejecting addition of premium as incorporating post merger value); Salomon Bros., Inc. v.
Interstate Bakeries Corp., No. 10,054, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 100 (Del. Ch. May 1, 1992) (also
rejecting addition of premium as incorporating post merger value); In re 75,629 Shares of
Common Stock of Trapp Family Lodge, Inc., 725 A.2d 927 (Vt. 1999) (30 percent premium for
control added to adjust for trading price of minority shares). But see Ronald v. 4-C's Elec.
Packaging, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (apparently rejecting addition of control
premium in buyout in lieu of dissolution where majority shareholder already possessed control);
Institutional Equip. & Interiors, Inc. v. Hughes, 562 N.E.2d 662 (Il1. App. Ct. 1990) (rejecting
addition of premium and discount as offsetting adjustments); BNE Mass. Corp. v. Sims, 588
N.E.2d 14 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (merger premium has no place in appraisal); Foglesong v.
Thurston Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 555 P.2d 606 (Okla. 1976) (minority shareholder has no
expectation of control and premium should not be considered in determining appraisal price);
Walter v. The Nucleus, Inc., No. 181, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 580, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug.
16, 1990) (rejecting addition of control premium as "simply a way to penalize the majority
stockholders for their controlling interest, or, conversely, to reward the minority stockholders
for the divestiture of their interests").
101. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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evidence based on discounted cash flow and premiums in comparable
transactions.102
Following Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court went on to
hold in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,103 that in
a situation in which a company is up for sale, the board of directors
has a duty to seek the highest price possible for the benefit of all the
stockholders and cannot favor one bidder over another because of
other considerations.tl10 In Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett,105 the court
held in the context of a short form merger that it is inappropriate to
apply a discount to minority shares simply because they are minority
shares, suggesting to some that minority shareholders should be
entitled to all elements of value that may be attributable even to
control shares. And in Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris,1°6 the court
held that in the appraisal of a parent company that owned 100 percent
of the stock of three operating subsidiaries, the parent should be
valued on the basis of the combined control value of the operating
companies apparently on the theory that the parent was in a position
to sell control if it chose to do so. 1°7
102. Id. at 712-13. Although it could be argued that basing appraisal price in part on
premiums in comparable transactions is equivalent to awarding some or all of the (percentage)
gain from the transaction, it is also true (as the Weinberger court suggested) that part of the
value of a company inheres in its potential as a takeover target (unless of course the company is
utterly takeover proof). The use of discounted cash flow ("DCF") (rather than GAAP
earnings) was also revolutionary (even though standard practice in the financial community)
because it is fundamentally inconsistent with notion that a noncontrolling shareholder cannot
dictate distributions. To be sure, it is fair to presume that the shareholders will eventually
receive distributions equal to the value of the company; DCF is based on the idea that the
corporation will distribute available cash as soon as it becomes available.
103. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
104. Id.; see also Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270,1282 n.20 (Del. 1994)
(shareholder is entitled to a premium where the transaction eliminates the potential for further
premium); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42-43 (Del.
1994) (stating the same as Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1282 n.20).
105. 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
106. 603 A.2d 796 (Del. 1992).
107. In most of the Delaware cases in which a control premium has been added, it has been
added to the value of subsidiary shares. Arguably, there is a stronger case for adding a premium
to subsidiary shares in the context of appraisal of parent company shares in that the subsidiary is
an asset of the parent and is owned (and controlled) for the benefit of all parent stockholders.
Where the subsidiary is the primary asset of the parent, however, as where the parent is a mere
holding company, there is something more than a little artificial about bootstrapping a
subsidiary premium into the valuation of the parent. But see Agranoff v. Miller, No. 16795, 2001
Del. Ch. LEXIS 71, at *50 n.45 (Del. Ch. May 15, 2001). Moreover, one must be careful to
allocate a control premium over all of the shares. In some cases, a controlling block may be
salable at a higher premium than all of the shares. For example, it is at least conceivable that a
buyer might be willing to pay a 100 percent premium for 51 percent of the shares, but only a 50
percent premium for 100 percent of the shares. On the other hand, one could also argue here
that in such a case the control premium is at the expense of the minority and signals the
likelihood of looting by the buyer.
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On the other hand, the decisions that seem to support minority
entitlement to some share of a control premium cannot be read in
isolation. There are just as many decisions that cut the other way.
For example, immediately following Weinberger, the court held in
Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co.108 that a majority shareholder in a cashout
merger need not reveal the highest price it would be willing to pay
simply because it controls the subsidiary and owes a fiduciary duty to
the minority. Then, in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time
Inc.,1°9 the court held that a Revlon duty to maximize'l ° does not arise
in a so-called strategic merger, in which two widely held companies
become one, and no one individual or discrete group buys or sells
control. And in Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc.,"' the court held that a
controlling stockholder has the right to sell its shares at a premium as
long as the premium is not diverted from the corporation. "2
In McMullin v. Beran,113 the Court of Chancery held that no
Revlon duty to maximize arises when a parent company decides to
sell a controlled subsidiary for cash even though it could possibly
have obtained a higher price in a differently structured transaction.
In so holding, the court noted that a change in control arises when the
shareholders lose a further opportunity to participate in a change of
control premium,11 4 and that Revlon does not apply to situations in
which control of the company rests with a single controlling
shareholder instead of the public."' The Delaware Supreme Court
reversed, holding that even in the absence of a change of control
(narrowly defined), there is still a duty to determine whether the deal
maximizes shareholder value so that minority shareholders may
108. 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985).
109. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
110. I use the phrase "duty to maximize" to distinguish this aspect of Revlon from numerous
other aspects such as the intermediate level of scrutiny. See Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp,
Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289 n.40 (Del. 1994) (citing Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M.
Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After QVC and Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and
the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 Bus. Law. 1593, 1593-94 (1994), as "noting inappropriateness of
such colloquialisms as "Revlon duties" and "Revlon-land" in arguments before [the Delaware
courts]").
111. 676 A.2d 436 (Del. 1996).
112. It should be noted that none of these were appraisal cases and that it could be argued
that the standard of valuation to be applied in an appraisal proceeding has been developed to
reflect special considerations in the context of transactions that give rise to appraisal. These
special considerations have never been articulated by the courts, however.
113. No. 16493, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 227 (Del. Ch. Dec. 1, 1999).
114. See Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040 (Del. Ch. 1997); see also
McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 918 (Del. 2000) (referring to a "final stage" transaction).
115. See Mendell v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297 (Del. Ch. 1994).
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decide whether to seek appraisal.16 To be sure, the court charac-
terized the cause of action primarily as one involving the board's
failure to inform itself and the minority."7 But the court also
characterized the subject of the required inquiry as the determination
"whether the merger consideration equaled or exceeded [the]
appraisal value of the company as a going concern.""' 8 Thus, although
McMullin is not itself an appraisal case, it is quite clear that the board
must consider the appraisal standard of value and that the courts will
certainly do so in reviewing whether the board has done its job.119
Even if there were some doubt about whether appraisal value
includes a control premium, there is no doubt that maximizing value
implies obtaining the highest possible premium. Moreover, there is
no reason for a shareholder to seek appraisal unless the appraisal
price is likely to be higher than the merger price. And if the merger
price involves any premium at all, which it almost invariably does,
presumably the reason for seeking appraisal is to obtain a still bigger
premium. 20
Whatever doubt was left after McMullin that the standard of
value in a Delaware appraisal proceeding includes a control premium
was put to rest in Agranoff v. Miller.2' Agranoff involved the
valuation of shares purchased in violation of a stockholder agreement
in order to determine the price at which the defendant would be
required to sell them to the plaintiff. Agranoff was not an appraisal
case, but because of doubts about the standard of value to be applied,
the court determined the value of the shares two different ways: (1)
based on fair market value principles that would be used in a context
other than an appraisal proceeding and (2) based on the appraisal-
unique fair value standard.' 22  As the court stated, comparable
companies analysis builds in a minority discount (in that it is based on
116. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000).
117. The court expressly declined, however, to establish a new disclosure standard where
appraisal is an option, citing Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170 (Del. 2000). McMullin,
765 A.2d at 925.
118. McMullin, 765 A.2d at 922.
119. Indeed, the McMullin court mentions appraisal eleven times in the opinion and refers
to maximizing value fourteen times. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000).
120. In all fairness, the McMullin court's focus on appraisal may have been necessitated by a
concern about materiality in that unless the minority stockholders could do something with the
information disclosed to them, it would be futile to require the board even to review the deal.
Id. at 922. The court does note, however, the possibility that the stockholders could have sought
an injunction. Id. at 917. Compare Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), with
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
121. Agranoff v. Miller, No. 16795, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 71 (Del. Ch. May 15, 2001).
122. Id. at *20-*29.
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prices at which minority stockholders trade small quantities of shares)
that must be corrected by adding back a premium for control in an
appraisal proceeding.123 And indeed, the court found that while the
fair market value of the shares was $41.02 (without any discount or
premium), the appraisal value was $51.13 (reflecting a 30 percent
control premium according to the court).12 4 Thus, there is simply no
doubt that the Agranoff court understood that the appraisal remedy
reflects unique policy values. 125  The Agranoff court struggled
somewhat with the question whether premiums in comparable
transactions arose because of what might be thought of as the
inherent value of control (which may or may not be an appropriate
element of appraisal value) as opposed to planned changes in
business strategy for the target (which clearly are not an appropriate
element of appraisal value under the language of the statute). In the
end, the court reasoned that even though the averaging of com-
parable company data would likely eliminate merger gains, a
reduction of the average premium from 40 percent to 30 percent
would help assure that only inherent control value was included. 2 6
The ultimate point for present purposes is that the idea that the
stockholders own the company has proven so powerful that the courts
of Delaware have arguably conferred a windfall on minority
stockholders in the form of a share of control value even when they
have no reasonable expectation of participation in control.
Presumably, this will translate into a higher cost of doing deals and
fewer deals getting done than should be done even if only at the
margin.
This cursory review of Delaware caselaw reveals that there are
two distinct questions to be addressed in connection with premiums in
appraisal proceedings. First, is it appropriate to add a premium at all
in the context of an appraisal proceeding even if there is a change of
control? Although this issue appears to be well settled in the
affirmative, the fact remains that the plaintiffs in an appraisal
proceeding are by definition dissenters who seek the value of their
shares prior to any gain or loss from the transaction. To be sure, as
the Delaware court suggested in Weinberger, every company is
potentially for sale and thus part of the value of every company is a
generic premium for control, as opposed to a specific premium for
123. Id. at *48-*54.
124. Id. at *57 -*59.
125. Id. at*23.
126. Id. at *54 n.49.
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control that may be offered by a bidder with specific plans for the
target. 127 The latter sort of deal-specific premium presumably should
not be part of an appraisal award.1 28 But even if one can get cozy with
the idea of awarding a premium in a change-of-control transaction, it
does not follow that it makes sense to award a premium in (say) a
going private merger in which the controlling shareholder remains in
control and where there was never any prospect of a sale of control. 29
In other words, should a premium for control be added even if it is
clear that the dissenters could not reasonably have expected a
premium under any other circumstances? 3 0 This is but one of the
questions that could hinge on whether we continue to view stock-
holders as owners.
CONCLUSION
Clearly theory matters to business. It led managers into the
conglomerate mergers of the 1960s. And arguably it led to the rise of
institutional investors, increasing leverage, the bust-up takeovers of
the 1980s, the boom in stock options as compensation, and the spin-
off mania of the 1990s. Theory also matters in the law, not only
because it guides the evolution of legal rules, but also because it
allows us to make sense of the rules we have. Moreover, theory
matters more in states where these cases arise less. A state supreme
court judge in a hotly contested case involving (say) a sale of control
in a state in which the court issues one or two corporation law
opinions a year arguably needs a good theory more than does a
Delaware chancellor who sees dozens of such cases. The theory that
a corporation is owned by its stockholders is fine for many purposes
but it is too simple for others. The danger is that too much deference
to stockholder interest may get in the way of transactions that
otherwise make sense and should go forward. Thus, it would seem
that theory may serve yet another purpose. When it leads to absurd
conclusions, it may signal to us that our understanding has reached a
127. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
128. The courts have done little to distinguish these two types of premiums, though it could
be said that averaging premiums paid for comparable companies may have the same effect.
129. To be sure, Weinberger itself was such a case, but the majority therein was held liable
for a breach of fiduciary duty in having failed to deal fairly with the minority.
130. Interestingly, the federal courts have recognized a parallel distinction in connection
with materiality determinations under the federal securities laws. Although it is well settled that
a fact need not be so important as to change the outcome of a vote or transaction in order to be
material, the courts recognize that when a fact cannot make a difference it is not material. See
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
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limit and that a new theory is needed. As Einstein said, a theory
should be simple but not too simple. Elegance is for tailors.
